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*
This paper examines the training of blue collar workers in three English-
speaking countries, chosen because of the historical similarities in the origins of their
training systems.
1
  It focuses on apprenticeship training because historically this was the main formal
method of manual worker skill formation in each country.  For the purposes of
analysis it also concentrates on the manufacturing sector, historically one of the main
areas of apprenticeship training.  However, in these three countries, apprenticeship
has fared very differently: it declined at an early date in the US in most sectors of the
economy; it survived intact in Britain well into the post-Second World War period;
and it has survived relatively strongly in Australia up to the present day, though it
is now under some pressure.  The experience of these countries is in contrast to the
German-speaking countries where apprentice systems have grown in coverage and
remain very strong to the present date.  Though apprenticeship is the main focus of
analysis, it is hoped that a consideration of this method of training may allow
broader conclusions to be drawn about skill formation more generally.
The paper is divided as follows.  The first section provides some definitions
and a framework of analysis.  Three sections then briefly trace the development of
apprenticeship training in each country.  A further section seeks to explain the course
of apprenticeship training and to investigate what has taken or is likely to take its
2place in each of the countries.  In the final section implications are considered and
conclusions are drawn.
Training arrangements
Apprenticeship is here defined as a method of employment and on-the-job
training which involves a set of reciprocal rights and duties between an employer and
a trainee (usually a young person): the employer agrees to teach or cause to be taught
a range of skills, usually of a broad, occupational nature; in return the apprentice
agrees to work for an extended period of time at a training wage which by custom
is relatively low compared to the skilled worker rate, but which normally rises on an
annual basis until the term of the apprenticeship is completed.  A contract between
the employer and the apprentice usually exists which may be in the form of a legal
indenture, a formal agreement, or an informal understanding.
For the purposes of analysis we would distinguish a number of different
methods whereby training may be organised and delivered.  In the first place,
training can be coordinated by market mechanisms.  In other words, market forces
of supply and demand determine training decisions, such as the decisions to take on
a trainee or to become a trainee; and there is mobility of workers, both trainees and
trained, within the external market place.  Second, training can be coordinated within
the firm or organisation by administrative mechanisms.  In other words, the amount
and type of training are determined according to administrative criteria and needs
within the internal labour market of the firm.  External price signals are less
important and the expectation is that there will be less external mobility.  Third,
training can be coordinated and funded by the state and provided within schools and
3educational institutions and financed in large part by government allowances.  In this
case training is likely to be of a more general nature and usually needs to be
supplemented by work-based experience.
This simple threefold typology may be further elaborated and developed.
There are other, less common, methods of training which might be included e.g.
patrimonial training within the family, such as is to be found in many small
businesses; and interfirm arrangements where a group of firms combine together to
provide training.  There are also further distinctions which may be made within each
of our three main categories.  Thus, there are different types of market arrangements.
Some markets for skill formation may be largely unorganised and competitive in the
classical free market sense.  In these markets, training decisions are mainly shaped
by supply and demand and price signals.  The expectation is that attachment between
trainees, workers, and firms will usually be short term.  Other markets may be more
organised and regulated.  In this latter category we would include what Kerr referred
to as guild or craft markets where customary practices and intermediate institutions,
such as trade unions and employers' associations, regulate market forces.   The
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traditional apprenticeship clearly approximates to this category.  Firms may also
differ in that some, to use Osterman's distinction, may have `industrial' internal
labour markets, with highly defined jobs and formal rules, such as seniority,
governing the status of employees and access to training; while others may have
`salaried' internal labour markets, with more flexible jobs and less rule-bound
conditions.   Industrial internal labour markets equate to the kind of highly
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constitutional systems which exist for blue collar workers in large unionised firms in
the US; salaried internal labour markets are more like those which cover many white
4collar, professional, and managerial employees, or those which are said to exist for
employees in the large firm sector in Japan.  Finally, the degree of state involvement
in training may also differ, in that it may, on the one hand, be essentially auxiliary
and supportive of market- or firm-based training arrangements or it may be highly
interventionist and directive in nature.  Of course, each of these is an ideal type, and
pure forms will rarely be observable in the real world where different arrangements
will usually coexist.  However, not all forms of training are compatible with one
another and, as we will see, one may undermine and displace another.
Apprenticeship usually partakes of a number of these modes.  Thus, it is very
clearly a system based on occupational markets which shape apprenticeship rules and
constitute the job market for skilled workers.  More competitive forces of supply and
demand also influence apprenticeship training e.g. they influence the employer's
decision to take on an apprentice, the young person's decision to be an apprentice,
and the starting wage of the apprentice.  Apprenticeships are usually served within
the one firm and so, for a period of time at least, the apprentice is a part of the firm's
internal labour market.  This internal labour market may span a range between the
industrial and salaried: the apprenticeship may be largely bound by rules or it may
be a less contingent and closer relationship.  Apprenticeship systems may also
overlap with state coordination of training in that apprentices may attend state-
funded educational institutions and the apprenticeship itself may be subject to certain
legislative requirements.
This paper considers how apprenticeship training has persisted or changed
over the years in these three countries, and what alternative arrangements have or
may take its place.
5The development of apprenticeship training in Great Britain
In all three countries apprenticeship was traditionally the main method of skill
formation for manual workers.  Either the worker did an apprenticeship or received
little formal training.  Non-apprentice workers usually acquired whatever skills they
needed more or less informally on the job.
In Britain the origins of apprenticeship go back to the guild system and
artisanal trades such as building and printing.   Traditionally the apprenticeship was
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of the domiciliary kind where the youth (invariably male) lived in with the master
who agreed to teach him the trade in return for productive labour.  By the mid
nineteenth century, this form of apprenticeship had more or less died out and been
replaced by the live-out apprenticeship.  This reflected the growth of larger firms and
a more arm's-length waged relationship within the market.  By the late nineteenth
century legal indentures had almost died out and been replaced by formal or
informal agreements binding the parties for between five and seven years.  By then
apprenticeship had spread from the artisanal trades to the newer metalworking
industries of engineering and shipbuilding and at the end of the nineteenth century
it also spread to plumbing and electrical work.  This suggests that apprenticeship had
much to commend itself to the parties concerned.  For employers, it performed real
economic functions: given low apprentice wage rates and productive output, it was
a cheap, and potentially profitable, method of training; given built-in incentives to
complete the apprenticeship, it facilitated investment in workers who were potentially
mobile;  given the widespread coverage of the system in many trades, it meant that
employers had some check on `free riding'; and given notions of occupational
standards, it ensured a supply of labour with recognisable skills.  Moreover it was
6supported by the craft unions which saw it as a way of controlling entry into their
trades and regulating other aspects of employment, though alone they were usually
not strong enough to enforce apprenticeship rules. 
The apprenticeship was usually served within the one firm (though there were
some so-called migratory apprenticeships), but it was market-orientated in that
training was supposed to be in all-round skills which were externally marketable.
This suited all the parties concerned.  It suited the apprentice and his family who
knew that the youth would have wider job opportunities.  It suited the employer who
was dependent on craft production methods and required genuine craft skills.  It also
suited other employers who could subsequently acquire such skills in the market.
In addition, it suited the trade union since a long period of training in all-round skills
restricted the supply of labour, rendered their members mobile, and provided a
support for wage rates.  In Britain the system was supported from the late nineteenth
century onwards by the development of collective bargaining of a multi-employer
nature.  This allowed for a measure of union monitoring and enforcement of rules
governing apprenticeship.  However, it should be stressed that in the British context
apprenticeship was given little state support and government intervention was
minimal.
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At various times in different industries, apprenticeship system came under
strain.  In the late nineteenth century it was subject to pressure of technological
change which made the traditional seven or five year period less necessary in
industries where there was a growing division of labour e.g. the footwear,
papermaking, and furniture trades.  During the First World War, it was subject to
pressures of dilution as non-time-served men and women were upgraded and as
7firms failed to take on apprentices.  During the depression of the interwar years, it
also came under strain as many employers used apprentices as cheap labour and
provided only narrow training.   During the Second World War, it again came under
6
pressure from dilution, upgrading, and failure to take on apprentices.  Again,
however, this was temporary and, in the first two decades after the war,
apprenticeship training remained the main formal method of skill formation for
manual workers.
Of course, over time there were changes in the system of apprentice training.
The period of training was gradually reduced during the course of the twentieth
century from seven to five and in some trades three years.  Before the First World
War, apprentices started to attend local government provided night school.  By the
Second World War a small, but growing number, were allowed day-release, and this
and block release became common after the Second World War.  Also a growing
number began to sit examinations and to receive formal qualifications, certified by
educational institutions.
Apprenticeship training was the subject of periodic criticism, and this grew
from the mid-1960s onwards.  The main criticisms were: that it involved a large
amount of unnecessary time-serving and time-wasting rather than training to
standards; it was often of a narrow nature not suited to the needs of modern
industry; it perpetuated demarcations between trades; and it was exclusive in that it
was restricted to young male workers in certain trades.
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In these circumstances there began a series of reform initiatives within industry
and some major interventions by government.  A small, but growing, number of
employers and training institutions became interested in training to standards,
8modular methods of training, and improvement of off-the-job training in colleges.
The 1964 Industrial Training Act, and the levy-grant and Industrial Training Board
(ITB) system which this introduced, supported apprenticeship training and also
promoted its reform.  The ITBs sought to spread the costs of training (including
apprenticeship training) and to extend formal training beyond the apprentice trades.
They also sought to develop new modular methods of training and set new standards
for apprenticeships.  Through the 1970s and into the 1980s reforms on these lines
were gradually implemented and modular and competency training began to replace
time-serving.  However, the system was not fundamentally reformed and by this time
it was being overtaken by other major changes affecting youth training in Britain.
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With rising unemployment from the mid-1970s and the political pressures
which this caused, governments introduced a series of schemes to combat youth
unemployment and to provide training.  The main development was the Youth
Training Scheme (YTS) introduced in 1983 and now called Youth Training (YT).  This
was a one-year, from 1986 two-year, system of training, under which the government
provided the funds and employers or other training agents provided the training.
The young persons were not apprentices with an employment status but trainees
with a government allowance.  There was no compulsion on employers to enter the
scheme and often there was a dearth of good training places; by contrast, from the
late 1980s onwards, there was a compulsion on unemployed youth to accept training
places or lose government benefits.
The advent of YT(S) put training on the agenda of many firms which had
previously given it little attention and spread formal training to young people who
would never have done an apprenticeship.  On the other hand, the schemes were
9largely intended to deal with problems of youth unemployment and much of the
training has been of a low level.  Some firms which traditionally had apprentices
replaced their programmes with YT trainees.  Others used YT as a screening device
and later upgraded some trainees to apprenticeship status.  Simultaneously therefore
YT both supported apprenticeship training by providing subsidies and undermined
it by providing a state funded alternative.
Other government interventions in the vocational education and training
system from the early 1980s onwards have had a profound, though often
contradictory, effect on the British schooling and training system.
In terms of schooling, Conservative governments have sought simultaneously
to raise academic standards and to introduce a greater vocationalism into education,
though, according to critics, without any significant increase in funding to accomplish
these two objectives.  They have encouraged staying on at school (though this is still
low by international standards), but have in practice done little to change the
basically academic system of examinations.  It is therefore debateable whether the
school to work transition process has been improved.  It is certain that nothing has
been done within the school system to support apprenticeship training.
In terms of training, Conservative governments have pursued a market
deregulatory approach.  The Thatcher government repealed the interventionist
Industrial Training Act and abolished most of the mandatory ITBs and the levy-grant-
exemption system.  In the process it also reduced trade union involvement in, and
monitoring of, training arrangements.  This has been replaced with a private-sector,
`employer-led' system of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), locally based
groupings of employers, charged with coordinating training locally and spending
10
central government funds on YT and training measures for the adult unemployed.
In keeping with its free market ideas and with the aim of pricing young people into
jobs and training, the government pursued various measures to reduce youth pay
and allowances.  In keeping with its ideas on greater choice, it encouraged private
providers and experimented with vouchers for trainees.  More recently, it has
initiated a national system of vocational qualifications under the National Council for
Vocational Qualifications.  Under this, employer dominated `lead bodies' are drawing
up a national framework of standards based on `competencies' rather than time
serving.  The intention is to create a national system of portable qualifications, though
these will be the subject of local employer testing.   According to critics, the standards
which are being established are often low and the range of skills narrow.   Moreover,
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given the general nature of the qualifications and the lack of any compulsion on
employers, there may well be an incentive to `free riding' unless employers can make
the training sufficiently firm specific to prevent portablity.
This set of government interventions from the early 1980s onwards has done
little to support the traditional apprenticeship system.  Indeed, cumulatively, they
have served to undermine it.  Thus, taking manufacturing apprentices as a percentage
of manufacturing employment, the ratio which had already fallen by 31 per cent
between 1969 and 1974 fell by a further 54 per cent between 1981 and 1987.   Thus,
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Britain now finds itself with a very mixed and uncertain system of skill formation:
deteriorating occupational labour market training; a move towards unregulated
markets; a simultaneous attempt to develop interfirm provision through the TECs;
a move towards internal labour markets, though this is uneven and incomplete;
11
more vocationalism within schools, but without a real system of school-based
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training; and a move towards greater state intervention, in terms of funding and
compulsion on the unemployed to take up training places, but without any
commensurate compulsion on employers.
The US
In the colonial period the US inherited from Britain a system of craft
apprenticeships which were the main formal method of training for manual workers
well into the nineteenth century.  However, these came under increasing pressure in
the course of the nineteenth century and, by the early twentieth century, the
traditional occupational apprenticeship had declined in most areas other than
construction, printing, and shipbuilding and in some metal working trades in a few
large urban centres.
12
Elbaum has recently described how the traditional apprenticeship declined in
the US because it lacked the efficiency advantages of the apprenticeship system in the
UK.   In the context of high levels of geographical mobility and employment
13
opportunities, it was difficult for American employers to enforce apprenticeship rules
and to prevent apprentices walking off with their employer's investment.
Occupational training markets, therefore, ceased to operate effectively and to provide
sufficient economic benefits for employers.  Jacoby has also described how, through
the nineteenth century, the apprenticeship system declined in the US as, during good
periods when labour mobility was high, employers found it increasingly difficult to
make apprentices complete their terms.  Some employers tried to remedy this with
elaborate, but not very successful, bonding systems.  By contrast, in bad periods,
employers found it burdensome to keep on apprentices and felt that their right to
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hire and fire was trammelled by apprenticeship rules.  This situation led to conflict
between employers and unions.  In this context, from the late nineteenth century
onwards, the traditional apprenticeship in the US was abandoned by most employers
and, where it survived, it was transformed into an institution which existed because
unions could impose apprentice rules on employers in industries such as construction
and printing.
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When viewed in comparative historical perspective, three other factors should
be added to explain the decline of apprenticeship training in the US.  First, American
employers could look to skilled immigrant labour entering the country, especially
from Britain, Germany, and other northern European countries where apprenticeship
training systems were strong.  As the kinds of skills of immigrants began to change
at the beginning of the twentieth century so employers had to turn to other strategies.
Second, the development of mass production systems in large US manufacturing
firms had a profound effect from the late nineteenth century onwards.  These
depended on well educated and trained managers (provided by the growing tertiary
education system), but could be operated with semi- and unskilled production
workers.  Third, in the US, not only were unions weaker, but multi-employer
bargaining was also less widespread than in the UK.  Hence, there was missing in
most sectors of the economy an important institutional support for apprentice
training and a way of enforcing collective employer provision.
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Of course, skilled manual workers were still required in manufacturing
industry.  In the US context, small and medium firms resorted to poaching,
immigrant labour, and upgrading informally on the job.  From the early twentieth
century onwards they also looked increasingly to training provided by expanding
13
high school and college level educational institutions.   Large firms, producing for
growing mass markets, using specialised mass production techniques, and pursuing
a greater division of labour, adopted an internal labour market strategy.  Firms, such
as Ford, GE, International Harvester, and Westinghouse, established their own
schools, where workers (sometimes called apprentices) were trained in skills which
were often more specific to the firm.   When these large companies were unionised,
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from the late 1930s, apprentice training arrangements often came to be organised
bilaterally by the employer and the union and were set down in company collective
agreements.  Access to training was in large part determined by administrative
criteria, especially seniority; training was a combination of on-the-job learning and
in-house and college-based instruction; and at the end of the training period, because
of the seniority accrued, the trainee was likely to stay with the firm.  This system had
the advantage that training was done and in a way that was efficient for specific
company production systems.  However, it had the disadvantages that it could be
narrow - training was for the job to be done, in line with the job-territory rules of the
`industrial' internal labour market; the period of return on investment could be
relatively short, because of the age of the apprentice (30s - 40s); and, from a broader
social perspective, the system excluded workers who were not insiders in the internal
labour markets of big firms.
Thus, in the non-union sector, training for skilled work was and still is
provided by a combination of informal on-the-job learning and varying degrees of
formal training and college-based instruction.  It is mainly in unionised parts of the
construction industry that the traditional occupational apprenticeship still persists and
a form of in-house apprenticeship also exists in some large unionised manufacturing
14
companies.  At the present time, there is some talk about (re)introducing
apprenticeship training in the US, the prospects for which are considered in the final
section.
17
Australia
Australia also inherited a system of apprenticeship training from Britain.
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However, as in the US, by the late nineteenth century, the apprenticeship system in
Australia had come under great pressure.  Legal indentures had largely died out and
been replaced by agreements of varying degrees of formality.  Moreover it was
becoming increasingly difficult to enforce apprenticeship rules.  In part this was
because of technological change which made the traditional period less necessary.
As in the US at this time, it may also have been difficult to enforce apprenticeship
rules in a situation where immigration and labour mobility were high.  In an
economy where cyclical fluctuations were pronounced, in times of economic
prosperity, apprentices quit their jobs, and, in times of depression, employers were
reluctant to take on and train apprentices.
However, apprentice training survived in Australia and prospered; and, of
these three English-speaking countries, it is in Australia that it has remained the
strongest.  In 1990 approximately 23 per cent of all employed 15 to 19 year olds in
Australia were doing an apprenticeship.   A rough calculation of total apprentices
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as a percentage of the employed labour force may be made for various years from
the late 1970s onwards.  This provides a figure of just over 2 per cent for Australia,
less than 1.5 per cent and declining for Great Britain, and around 0.25 per cent for the
US.   For the metal working industries, apprentices represented roughly 10 per cent
20
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of employment in Australia, 3 per cent in Britain, and around 0.5 per cent in the
US.   By international standards the Australian figure is high and is surpassed only
21
by German-speaking and related countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and
Denmark) where apprenticeship also covers a broader range of occupational
groups.   If manufacturing alone is considered, Australia in the mid-1980s had a
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slightly higher proportion of manual worker apprentices (10.6 per cent of all
manufacturing employees in Australia as opposed to 10.1 per cent in West
Germany).   A number of factors combined to ensure the survival and growth of
23
apprentice training in Australia.
The apprenticeship system suited the product and labour market situation of
Australian employers.  In manufacturing industry, in the early twentieth century,
given that product market size was limited and much work was of a small batch,
jobbing, or repair nature, scope for capital substitution was low, and what was
required by employers were all-round, adaptable skills such as were produced by the
apprenticeship system.  Firms, which were often small in size and with weak
managerial hierarchies, were not for the most part able to develop internal labour
market systems of training.  The external labour markets in which Australian
employers operated were not as subject to mass immigration as in the US in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and, though mobility was high, it was for
the most part within a few relatively concentrated urban labour markets.  In these
circumstances, apprenticeship continued to perform a valuable economic function
facilitating investment in training and providing a good supply of workers with all-
round, recognisable skills.
24
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Another major support for apprenticeship training in Australia was the role
of the state and the development of a distinctive industrial relations system.  From
the early twentieth century, the creation of a system of compulsory arbitration and
legally-binding awards served to restore and codify apprenticeship rules and make
them legally enforceable on employers.  As this extensive and elaborate award system
developed, it laid down, for each major trade, rules on the numbers, conditions, and
wages of apprentices.  These awards were either regional or national and acted as a
proxy for industry-wide bargaining and a form of market-wide regulation.  The
award system also served to strengthen trade unions and in this way provided
further institutional support for apprenticeship.
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In Australia the state also played an important role in two other respects.
First, the largest employers in Australia were federal or state institutions such as the
railways and public utilities.  In a spirit of public service and a monopolistic market
situation, these employers felt obliged and able to support apprenticeship training.
26
Second, from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, Australia developed
a strong system of technical institutions where trade courses were taught and which
apprentices attended in relatively larger numbers than their counterparts in the UK
and the US.  Because of the factors cited above this did not displace but rather
complemented, apprenticeship training.  To this day, the system of Technical and
Further Education (TAFE) institutions is prominent in Australia and plays a major
part in apprenticeship training.
27
It is true that in certain periods the system of apprentice training in Australia
came under pressure.  During the two world wars, it was subject to pressures of
dilution and upgrading on the job.  During the depression of the interwar years, it
17
also came under pressure as many employers used apprentices as cheap labour and
failed to train.  After the Second World War, the apprenticeship system came under
pressure from immigration.  Before the war, immigrants into Australia had been
mainly from the UK, and British craftsmen could be easily absorbed into the
Australian system.  After the war, the potentially disruptive effect of higher levels of
immigration into Australia, from a broader spread of countries, was regulated by the
award system and the Tradesmen's Rights Regulation Act.  This legislation, passed
in 1946 at trade union prompting, established a system for testing the craft skills of
immigrants.
28
Of course, over time there were changes in the system of apprenticeship
training.  As in the UK, the period of training was reduced from seven to five or
three years; night school and subsequently day and block release became an integral
part of the system - before this occurred in the UK.  All these changes were codified
in the award system.  As in the UK, from the 1960s onwards, there was some
questioning of apprenticeship training.  Rather more slowly, through from the 1970s
and into the 1980s, these criticisms started to be acted upon: modular- and standards-
based training began to replace time-serving and off-the-job training in colleges was
improved.
29
The more recent direction of change and reform of training in Australia has
had certain similarities to the UK, but also critical differences and until now it has not
undermined the traditional apprenticeship system to the same extent.
With rising unemployment, Australian governments in the 1980s introduced
schemes to combat youth unemployment and to provide training for those who might
otherwise not receive any.  However, the state-sponsored Australian Traineeship
18
Scheme (ATS) has not been the mass scheme which YT(S) has been in the UK.  The
ATS provides less subsidy to employers; participants are waged employees of the
firm and not trainees on a government allowance; and the scheme has mainly
covered areas where apprenticeship training never existed such as female clerical
work.  Simultaneously the government has also subsidised apprenticeships.   Like
30
Britain, Australia has recently started to create a system of national vocational
qualifications based on competencies and output standards rather than time serving.
It is proposing to introduce a system of Australian Vocational Certificates (AVCs)
which will provide an integrated national framework of qualifications and career
pathways.  However, in the Australian case, trade unions have been closely involved
in the process and apprenticeship is likely to remain a key part of the system.   The
31
Australian approach has been more to build on its existing system, and it is only in
the metal trades that there has been a significant decline in apprentice numbers in
recent years.
32
Very important in Australia have been recent developments in the award
system and the process of so-called award restructuring and enterprise bargaining.
Under this, wages and conditions have been redesigned to provide for broader job
bands and to encourage multiskilling within these bands.  The intention has also been
to create new career job paths and related pay structures.  In some cases, this has
been done through enterprise bargaining, and, where this has happened, this may
well encourage stronger internal labour markets and related training arrangements.
In other situations, award restructuring has taken place at industry level e.g. in the
metal industry where both employers and unions support the process.  In this and
other cases, apprenticeship remains a part of the restructured awards and broader
19
jobs require a broad basis of skills which apprenticeship training can provide.  In this
sense, the reform of apprenticeship training in Australia has been very much driven
by broader industrial relations reform in a way that it has not in the US or in the UK.
Under Labor governments, Australia has not gone down the free market,
deregulatory road of the UK where the apprenticeship system is declining, in part
because of this policy.  Indeed government intervention in the form of the TAFE
system remains strong and in 1990 the government introduced the Training
Guarantee Act which compels employers to spend a certain amount of payroll on
training which may include apprenticeship training.  Thus in Australia, the traditional
apprenticeship has for the most part remained quite strong and has been
supplemented by greater state intervention.
Discussion
There are a number of possible explanations for the diverse fate of
apprenticeship systems in these three countries.  A first set of explanations might
focus on the supply side and on apprentices and potential apprentices.  For example,
it could be argued that participation rates in schooling and the availability of other
forms of education and training have an effect on apprenticeship uptake.  Where
participation rates are high and further educational opportunities are available, this
may have a negative effect on the uptake and quality of apprenticeships.  In this
respect, earlier higher participation rates in the US may have contributed to the
decline of apprenticeship training in that country relative to the UK and Australia in
the early twentieth century.  The more recent increase in participation in Britain may
similarly have contributed to the decline of apprenticeship training in that country
20
over the last 20 years.  However, there are serious problems with such an
explanation.  It does not really fit the chronology for the US where much of the
decline in apprentice training occurs before high levels of participation are achieved,
and, in terms of the comparison between Britain and Australia, it does not square
with the fact that participation rates in Australia are higher than in Britain, but
apprenticeship uptake is also higher.   (The case of Germany also suggests that high
33
participation rates may simply improve the standard of entrants to apprenticeships.)
A second and more useful set of explanations might relate to the price of
apprentice labour and the return on the investment in an apprenticeship.  There are
a number of interrelated arguments here: one is that, where apprentice wages are
high relative to skilled workers wages, employers will not take on apprentices
because of the high cost of training; another is that, where apprentice wages are low
relative to the wages of other young people, this will raise foregone earnings and act
as a disincentive to the potential apprentice; a third argument is that where the
lifetime differential between apprenticed and non-apprenticed workers is low, this
will also be a disincentive to doing an apprenticeship.
Unfortunately, we do not have the kind of historical evidence adequately to
explore these hypotheses.  What can be said is that, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, apprentice pay relative to skilled workers wages were probably
higher in the US than in Britain and high apprentice rates in the US may have
contributed to the decline of apprentice training in that country.   Certainly union-
34
negotiated rates for mature apprentices in US manufacturing in the postwar period
have been high.  In the UK, apprentice-craftsmen differentials narrowed during and
after the Second World War and, over the postwar period, this may cumulatively
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have had a negative effect on apprenticeships.   However, in Australia, apprentice-
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craftsmen differentials have probably also narrowed over the course of the twentieth
century and especially after the Second World War, but this has not had such an
adverse effect on apprenticeship numbers.  In part this might be explained by the fact
that in Australia there have been various schemes whereby the government has
subsidised apprenticeships and hence maintained their appeal to employers.
The relationship between apprentice wages and those of other young workers
is also difficult to ascertain historically.  Wages of apprentices relative to other young
people may historically have been low in the US and this may have contributed to
the decline of apprenticeship in that country.   A likely widening of earnings
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differentials between apprentices and other young people in the UK in the postwar
may have had a negative effect on apprenticeship uptake.  However, again Australia
poses a problem in that there also this differential probably widened, but without a
decline in apprentice numbers.   Equally, in terms of age wage profiles, these are
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probably steepest in the US for skilled workers and flattest in Australia, but, as we
have seen, contrary to what this would imply, the apprentice system remains
strongest in Australia.   We obviously cannot draw very firm conclusions from these
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observations, but the effect of the price of labour would seem to be somewhat
contradictory.  It may be more important therefore to concentrate on institutional
forces in explaining the decline and persistence of apprenticeship.
It would seem likely that the coverage and structure of trade unions and
collective bargaining will have an effect on apprenticeship systems.  An argument
might be put here that, in the US, apprenticeship declined because of the low levels
of trade union membership and limited coverage of collective bargaining, especially
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multi-employer bargaining.  Where in the US unions are strong, apprenticeship
systems still exist, as is the case in some areas of construction and in some large
manufacturing plants.  Australia would seem to fit this argument well, for, in that
country, relatively strong craft unions and the award system (which acts as a proxy
for regional or national industry bargaining) have undoubtedly been an important
support of the apprenticeship system.  The story for Britain is, however, rather more
complicated and somewhat less convincing.  Relative to the US, strong craft trade
unions and multi-employer bargaining probably supported and enforced the
apprentice system historically.  A problem with this argument is that apprenticeships
start to decline in Britain from the late 1960s and through the 1970s, during a period
when unions remained strong.  However, this was also a period during which multi-
employer bargaining declined and single-employer bargaining may have been less
effective in regulating apprentice systems.  In the 1980s in Britain, union power has
declined considerably and this may well have contributed to the decline of
apprenticeship systems.
The experience of other countries such as Germany would also lend support
to the argument that trade unions and collective bargaining constitute an important
institutional prop to apprenticeship training.  However, in Germany, the state would
also seem to have played an important part in the maintenance of an effective
apprenticeship system.   What role has the state played in these three English-
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speaking countries?   Though in the US legislation regulating apprenticeships does
exist,  this is minimal and it could not be said that federal and state governments
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have given much positive support to apprenticeship systems.  However, in the UK,
there was also minimal legislative support for such systems of training, yet
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apprenticeship survived and prospered well into the post-Second World War period.
Later government intervention probably had an effect in the UK: in the 1970s the ITB
system probably supported apprenticeships and slowed down their decline; in the
1980s government interventions and hostility probably undermined them.  In the case
of Australia, we have argued that the award system, supportive legislation, and a
corporatist approach to industrial relations generally have been significant supports.
All these explanations are cumulatively important.  However, as or more
significant have been the needs and capabilities of employers in their respective
technological and market contexts.  In the US, from the late nineteenth century
onwards, employers found the costs of apprenticeship training outweighed the
benefits: the costs in terms of wages and restrictions on managerial prerogatives were
compounded by difficulties in enforcing apprenticeship.  In these circumstances,
small and medium employers looked to the external labour market, immigrant
labour, and upgrading on the job.  Large firms, increasingly using mass production
systems and deploying extensive managerial hierarchies, developed their own in-
house training arrangements, more in keeping with the internal labour market
systems they were putting in place.  As Lazonick has described it, this created a
system of high levels of education and skill at the top of the firm, but low levels of
skill at lower levels within firms and among outsiders.
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For Britain, Elbaum's argument - that apprenticeship survived because it could
be enforced and because it provided real benefits to employers in terms of a return
on training investment - is persuasive.  But to this must be added an argument about
the product and labour market situation of firms.  British product markets were
historically smaller and more fragmented than those in the US.  In many British
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industries firms produced a wide range of more customised products and for this
they relied on relatively craft-intensive labour such as was provided by the
apprenticeship system.  Historically British firms were also often small or medium
size and even larger firms were usually loosely coordinated.  Such firms had weak
managerial hierarchies and were reliant on craft labour to organise production.  In
these kinds of product market conditions, with weak corporate structures and
managerial hierarchies, and, given an adequate supply of unskilled and skilled
labour, internal labour markets were slow to develop in British firms.  It made sense,
for British firms, to rely on occupational rather than internal labour markets to
provide skilled workers.
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Apprenticeship training began to decline in the UK from the early 1970s for
a number of reasons, crucial among which was growing employer dissatisfaction with
traditional apprenticeship.  A largely unreformed apprenticeship system and high
apprentice wage rates made apprenticeship seem less appropriate in the context of
growing product market competition and increased technological change.  Moreover,
from the mid 1970s, with rising unemployment, it became easier for employers to
pick up skilled labour in the external labour market.  As in the interwar years many
opted not to train; others looked to the new state-based YT(S) system; and some large
firms increasingly looked to internal labour market methods of delivery.
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In Australia, union and government support for apprenticeship training has
undoubtedly been important.  Just as important, however, have been the needs and
capabilities of Australian employers.  Apprenticeship survived in Australia because
it has to a large extent continued to meet the requirements of firms.  Operating in
relatively protected product markets and with still a large part of work of a small
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batch, jobbing, and maintenance and repair kind, Australian firms need a relatively
large number of all-round, craft-type workers.  These they can obtain from the
apprenticeship system and the occupational labour market.  Until recently there has
been little incentive to bypass the external market and build internal labour market
arrangements.
It is true that there are some signs that apprenticeship may be under pressure,
especially in the Australian metalworking sector.   In a situation of enhanced
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product market competition and with production technologies which require more
flexible labour, employers increasingly feel the need for a more cost effective training
arrangements.  It has also been easier in recent years, because of high levels of
unemployment, to pick up skilled labour in the external labour market.  Large firms
may seek to train their labour forces within their own internal labour markets.   On
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the other hand, total apprenticeship numbers have held up well in Australia and
there are forces which will make for the survival of apprenticeship training.  Much
of Australian manufacturing industry is still of the small batch kind and requires
retro-fitting and in-house maintenance.  Technological change is breaking down
barriers between trades and demanding a more flexible labour force, but the
apprenticeship system, reformed on the lines of award restructuring and the AVC
system, may be able to provide this.  Australian firms have not yet developed very
strong internal labour markets and, indeed, there is no strong incentive for them to
do so when occupational markets work reasonably well.
In assessing apprenticeship and alternative methods of training in these three
countries, a number of points may be made, in the context of our initial typology of
methods of skill formation.
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A free market-based system of training may have some advantages in terms
of greater responsiveness to market forces and greater mobility between firms.  This
may make skill formation more relevant to the real needs of industry and encourage
allocative efficiency within the economy.  However, market failure can mean free-
riding and a short-sighted approach to training.  In turn, in periods of economic
upswing this will mean skill shortages, poaching, and a bidding up of wages.  This
has been a phenomenon of Britain in the 1980s.
Internal labour market provision has advantages in that firms may be more
willing to invest in skill formation and training arrangements can be integrated into
the firm's total human resource system.  Initial training of young workers and further
training of adult workers can be better related within a company's internal labour
market.  On the other hand, internalised systems are, by definition, exclusive of
outsiders; they may lead to training in narrow, firm-specific skills; and where they
are uneven in coverage, they do not have the benign effect on levels of training
throughout the economy.  The US has captured many of the advantages of internal
labour market-type training, and, for those who gain access to American internal
labour markets, lifetime training may be higher than in the UK and Australia where
training is more confined to entry level training of the traditional apprenticeship
type.   However, the US has also suffered from some of the disadvantages and, in
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the case of manual workers, few firms have developed anything like strong `salaried'
internal labour markets.  In the case of Britain, and even more Australia, it would 
seem that internal labour markets are not sufficiently well developed to deliver
significant training advantages for the economy as a whole.
State intervention may overcome some of the problems of external and internal
labour market failure.  State provision of training and funds may improve access and
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extend training to the broader population.  More directive state intervention, such as
was attempted in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s and in Australia in the 1980s, may
put training on the agenda of firms which previously neglected training.  State-based
quasi-apprenticeship systems such as YT(S) and ATS can subsidise and improve
access to training.  There are also some merits in the creation of a national system of
vocational qualifications such as is being put into place in both Britain and Australia:
these can create recognisable career paths and portable qualifications.  However, the
disadvantages of state intervention are that it often gives priority to job creation, and
the quality of training, especially on-the-job training, can be low.  France moved in
the direction of a state-based system in the 1980s, but there the government has
invested considerable resources and brought about major changes in educational
systems in a way that has not happened in the three English-speaking countries.
Apprenticeship training, even as gradually reformed as it has been in Britain
and Australia since the 1970s, has many disadvantages: it is still restricted to certain
trades; it has tended to exclude women and older workers; it may create an entry
level or once-and-for-all view of training; and it may still perpetuate demarcations
in industry.  However, on the other hand, apprenticeship training has much to
commend it.  It is a work-based system of initial skill formation which makes possible
employer investment in employees who are potentially mobile.  If endowed with the
right sort of institutional supports, it can ensure training by a broad spread of
employers and in a broad range of skills.  These skills can then later be built upon
throughout a working life and transferred within an occupational labour market.
Such a system exists in Germany where it is generally acknowledged to be one
reason for that country's competitive advantage.  However, it would be difficult to
create or recreate such a system in the US and the UK without significant institutional
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supports.  Yet, where it still survives, and where it is relatively strong as in Austalia,
it would seem sensible to retain it.
Conclusions
Apprenticeship has fared differently in these three English-speaking countries:
it declined at an early date in most industries and firms in the US; it survived
reasonably intact in Britain well into the post-Second World War period; and it is still
relatively strong in Australia.  Over the last decade, free market-based approaches to
training were in vogue in the US and Britain; there may also have been a move
towards a strengthening of internal labour market systems in Britain and Australia,
though these are still underdeveloped compared to the US; in all three countries there
has been greater state interest in training, though this has ranged from the purely
facilitative in the US, to the more interventionist in Britain, and the even more
directive in Australia.  The outcome of these changes is that these three countries find
themselves with very mixed systems of training which are commonly held not to
compare well with Germany (with its apprenticeship system), Japan (with its strong
internal labour market-based system), or France (with its school-based system).
Where apprentice training survives in these English-speaking countries, there is much
to commend its continued existence.  However, to survive in the future or to be
revived, it needs significant institutional and government support and incentives or
compulsions for employers.
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